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NSC 689,151,  
6/22/89

30 June 1961

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6/22/89~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR


Subject: Acheson Report on Berlin.  
(ATTCHD)

Julien will be here  
1130 Sun A.M. to  
tell you about meeting  
Thursday. I told him you'd  
be in

Colonel Ewell attended the NSC meeting on Thursday afternoon and is prepared to tell you what went on. The White House wants all copies of the Acheson Report returned immediately, but we asked for an exception for you. I will hand-carry it back Monday to Bromley Smith. What follows here is designed to save you a little time in reading the report.

First, this is a preliminary version; recommendations and conclusions will be sharpened and included in the final version. Most of those who have read it think it very good and, in my opinion, its outstanding merit is that it thinks through a careful stretch-out of preparatory actions, beginning immediately and not focused solely on Berlin. This is a far cry from trundling along with business as usual until the East Germans try to stamp our documents, and then rushing tank battalions to the check points.

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Acheson's three stages of preparatory action cover (a) 4 July until West German elections 17 September, (b) 17 September until signing of USSR-GDR peace treaty and (c) [redacted]

I feel sure you will want to read in full the military and political preparatory steps covered on pages 9-13, and perhaps the economic steps on pages 14-15.

In his Section III on "Negotiations" Acheson is conservative, rejects several proposals, and says the best time for negotiations from our viewpoint and Khrushchev's will be after our military preparations are under way but before the peace treaty is signed. Acheson's idea is a "Solution C," with modifications, which he develops beginning bottom page 19 to middle page 21.

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Acheson moves fast in his Section IV, "The Use of Force," the first part of which carries the ominous heading of "The Casus Belli." Ignoring some necessary diplomatic footwork because of our non-recognition of the GDR, it boils down to this:

[REDACTED]

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